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This paper discusses Mexico's stabilization efforts 
over the last two years, as related to the wider 
framework of the country's economic behaviour and 
the major elements in the external sector of the 
economy. 
It is divided in three sections. First, a general 
look is taken of the country's economic evolution in 
the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, leading up to 
the inception of the current stabilization drive in 
December 1987. This overview of past events is 
rather sketchy, since it has no other purpose than to 
provide information which might be useful in 
appraising the design and implementation of the 
stabilization policy. The second section comprises a 
rather detailed but, I hope, not over-lengthy analysis 
of the main elements in the stabilization policy and 
its evolution from December 1987 to December 
1989. Attention is given both to the process of policy 
formulation and to the actual implementation of the 
agreed measures and their consequences on prices 
(including labour and capital prices) and output. 
Some of its major social implications are discussed, 
albeit briefly. Finally, the third section deals with the 
future, trying to present the main perspectives that 
are now perceived for the Mexican economy as a 
whole and, in particular, for the stabilization policy 
objectives. 
•Ambassador of Mexico to the People's Republic of 
China. This paper is based on a document prepared for the 
International Seminar on Planning Methodologies and 
Technical Progress organized by China's State Planning 
Commission (Guangzhou, 9-11 January 1990). The views 
here expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Mexican government. 
I 
The Mexican economic 
experience: 1976-1987 
1. An overview of long-term trends 
Nearly all studies of Mexico's post-war economic 
evolution used to emphasize the seemingly 
miraculous combination of rapid, sustained 
growth and price stability, with no exchange 
restrictions. For 20 years up to the mid-1950s, 
the economy grew at an average annual rate of 
5.8%, the real value of production trebled while 
the per capita product doubled, and prices 
increased at a yearly average of around 3 % 
(Soils, 1970). During the 12-year period between 
1959 and 1970, the annual rate of growth of the 
GDP averaged 6.8% while the inflation, 
measured by the GDP deflator, stood at 3.6% per 
annum. From 1971 to 1975, however, the rate of 
economic growth decreased to 5.6%, while 
inflation accelerated to 12.3% annually (Nafin, 
1977). The rate of exchange remained 
unchanged for a long period, standing at 
Mex$12.5 to the US dollar from 1954 to 1976. 
Over that long period, rapid population 
increases meant that fast economic growth 
translated into moderate but sustained gains in 
per capita output and income levels. Growth was 
uneven, however, both among sectors and 
among regions. Both in the dynamic and the 
traditional sectors, it was concentrated in a 
relatively small number of large industrial and 
services conglomerates and around a few 
development poles. Substantial areas remained 
largely outside the development process. 
Modern, efficient agriculture was concentrated 
in the irrigated lands, mainly in the Northwest, 
while low-productivity subsistence farming 
remained dominant in the backward rural areas. 
Regional development gaps appeared and 
rapidly got worse. Income and wealth 
distribution remained very uneven and 
worsened in the long run. All in all, this 
sustained but uneven growth produced, in the 
view of some scholars, the emergence of two, or 
even many, Mexicos. 
The total population increased by 100% 
between 1940 and 1965 and doubled again in the 
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following 20 years. A very rapid process of 
urbanization also took place. In the mid-1970s, 
nearly two-thirds of Mexico's population lived in 
cities, as opposed to about one-third in the early 
1940s (Nafin, 1977). High population growth 
was the result of rapidly diminishing mortality 
rates (particularly infant mortality), as a 
consequence of greatly improved sanitary 
conditions. Public expenditure brought about 
enormous increases in educational and health 
services, and standards of living improved for 
all: slowly for the majority and very fast for the 
privileged. 
In the external sector, the import-
substituting industrialization process succeeded 
in augmenting domestic supply of final-use 
goods, but resulted in increased needs of 
imported inputs, spare parts, equipment and 
technology. At the same time, the export supply 
remained weak, since manufactured production 
was mainly directed towards meeting demand in 
a protected domestic market. Thus, imports 
increased fast while exports lagged behind. 
Exports, which used to cover more than four-
fifths of imports in the early 1950s, were 
equivalent to less than half in the mid-1970s. 
Net income from services transactions, mainly 
tourism, also weakened and the current account 
deficit widened constantly. Exchange rate 
overvaluation became a major factor in the 
worsening of the external payments position. 
For all practical purposes, the long period of 
sustained stability and growth, usually referred 
to as "stabilizing development", which started 
soon after the Second World War, came to a 
close in September 1976, with the first 
devaluation of the Mexican currency in 22 years.1 
2. 1976-1982 from bust to boom —and back 
The end of exchange rate immobility in 1976 
came about amidst a strong deceleration of 
economic growth and a spurt of inflation. In 
1975-1976, growth was no more than half the 
1
 Among many others, the overviews of Mexico's long-term 
development offered by Vernon (1963), Soli's (1970) and Hansen 
(1971) are particularly noteworthy. The pioneering study on 
income distribution is that by Martinez ( 1960) and a more updated 
analysis of inequality is to be found in the essays collected by 
Gordera-Tello (1984). A brief summary of the development 
imbalances in this decade is to be found in Navarrete (1971). 
average rate of earlier in the decade, and since 
1973 the inflation rate had reached two digits. 
This also marked the start of a period of acute 
instability. The economy went from bust to 
boom conditions, registering from 1977 to 1980 
the highest rates of growth in recent history, 
only to fall back into recession in 1981-1982, 
with decreases of -0.5. and -5.3% in the real 
GDP. Inflation followed a steep upward trend, 
going into three digits in 1983, and devaluation 
cut the value of the Mexican currency by more 
than six: from 12.5 to 96.48 pesos to the dollar at 
the close of 1982 (Nafin, 1988). 
The main factors behind the economic boom 
of the late 1970s were the big oil discoveries, 
which allowed a very rapid increase in crude oil 
exports. The resulting ample foreign exchange 
receipts, complemented with a large inflow of 
capital, financed high levels of public spending 
and, consequently, an important expansion of 
aggregate demand. In this way, for a few years at 
the close of the 1970s, Mexico attained very high 
levels of investment, production, employment 
and social welfare. 
However, the boom was not sustainable 
because of increasing dependence on oil 
revenues, both for financing public expenditure 
and balancing external payments, and 
decreasing domestic resource generation. The 
expansionary policy relied too much on external 
demand and external borrowing. Domestic 
inflation ran well ahead of periodic exchange 
rate corrections, producing long spells of serious 
overvaluation of the Mexican currency, and the 
economy became vulnerable to external shocks. 
These came, by mid-1981, in the form of 
falling international oil prices, unprecedented 
high levels of international interest rates, and a 
severe recession in the industrial countries 
which further curtailed non-oil exports and 
tourism income. The current account balance 
position became untenable: the deficit almost 
doubled every year between 1977 and 1981, 
reaching a total of US$16.1 billion in the latter 
year. 
The initial reaction to the external shocks 
was to delay adjustment and engage in 
unprecedented levels of foreign borrowing. In 
1981, for instance, public external debt increased 
by US$19.9 billion, and in the following year 
public debt service reached US$10.6 billion or 
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nearly 40% of current account revenue (Banxico, 
1987). By August 1982, the situation became 
untenable, forcing the suspension of debt service 
payments —a step which marked the beginning 
of the current phase of the debt crisis. 
3. 1983-1987: incomplete adjustment 
and external shocks 
The onset of the crisis in August 1982 elicited a 
strong policy response by the Mexican govern-
ment, particularly by the new administration 
which took office in December that year and 
"introduced a comprehensive three-year pro-
gramme which contemplated a structural reform 
of public finances, a moderate wage policy, a 
tight monetary policy, flexible exchange rate and 
interest rate policies and the liberalization of 
trade and exchange rate controls" (Banxico, 
1987). 
The objectives were, in the short term, to 
reduce inflation and cut down the public and 
external deficits and, in the medium term, to 
promote savings and investment, restore price 
stability, enhance economic efficiency and reduce 
the dependence on foreign financing. 
Additionally, a more manageable external debt 
situation was sought, through a series of 
renegotiations. 
This basic two-pronged policy approach 
—combining short-term adjustment measures 
and longer-term structural reform policies— 
remained in force until late 1987. At several 
points in time, mainly at mid-1985 and in early 
1986, the policy was strengthened to respond to 
unfavourable external factors such as the 
collapse of international oil prices, the sharp 
increases in international interest rates and the 
drying-up of international financial flows. 
Over the five-year period, short-term 
adjustment policy brought about a turnaround in 
some major variables in the Mexican economy: 
— First, it produced impressive current account 
surpluses. These were a result, initially, of a 
major restriction on the import expenditure, 
which severely affected the growth 
prospects of the economy. Later, they 
reflected an equally impressive expansion of 
export receipts, coming mainly from non-oil 
exports, maquiladoras and tourism. 
— Secondly, it resulted in spectacular 
improvements in the public finances. The 
primary economic deficit disappeared and a 
sizeable economic surplus, which reached 
between 2% and 5% of the GDP, was 
generated. 
— Thirdly, despite initial partial successes, the 
adjustment was not able to reduce inflation 
in a significant way. 
To implement the adjustment policy 
throughout the period, two major tools were 
consistently used: on the one hand, very 
aggressive exchange rate and interest rate 
policies remained in force, keeping the former 
undervalued and the latter substantially positive, 
in order to fulfil the balance-of-payments goals; 
on the other, a policy of virtual indexation of the 
prices of public sector goods and services was 
followed, in order to fulfil the public finance 
goals. 
These policies were implemented in a 
situation in which both the nominal levels of 
exchange and interest rates and the inflation 
floor continued moving up most of the time. For 
this reason, at any given moment a greater 
undervaluation of the currency was needed to 
achieve the same degree of incentive to export; a 
higher real interest rate was needed to keep the 
same degree of incentive to save and to 
repatriate capital; and a fuller indexation of 
prices of public sector goods and services was 
needed to avoid erosion of the public revenues. 
Additionally, the adjustment was sustained over 
a period far longer than originally envisaged. 
The policy mix for short-term adjustment, 
the context in which it was implemented 
and the fact that it was applied over a long 
period —together with a worsened external 
environment—2 produced some undesirable 
results: 
— First, the growth potential of the economy 
was severely curtailed. The reduction of 
import expenditure and public investment 
2The main negative external factors, present throughout the 
period, can be summarized as follows: a) Access to foreign markets 
for Mexican exports, mainly non-oil exports, was obstructed by 
protectionist and other trade-restrictive measures adopted by 
many developed countries and by the imposition of "graduation" 
and reciprocity criteria for the GSP and in wider areas —including 
the linking of trade with investment and intellectual property 
issues; b) The constant worsening of the terms of trade, arising 
mainly out of the wide fluctuations in commodity prices, including 
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affected growth prospects. Several years of 
negative or nil growth —interwoven with 
years of hesitant recovery— abruptly altered 
the expectations of the economic agents. A 
"culture of stagnation" emerged, replacing 
the "culture of growth" associated with the 
epoch of sustained development in previous 
decades. As a final result, real economic 
growth in the whole 1983-1988 period was 
virtually nil, averaging only 0.1% for the 
five-year period (Banxicp, 1989 a). 
— Second, a heavy social price was paid: real 
wages greatly diminished, high inflation 
meant even more unequal income 
distribution and social public expenditure 
was curtailed. In short, per capita income 
levels dropped and standards of living fell. 
— Third, financial investment was privileged 
over productive investment. Towards the 
close of the period, the very short-term 
financial assets turned out to be the most 
attractive and a strong bias against long-
term capital formation emerged. 
— Fourth, the amount of financial expenditure 
tied up by the servicing of domestic and 
external debt reached inordinate and 
towering levels —over a fifth of the GDP for 
1988. The primary economic surplus was 
totally absorbed by, and resulted insufficient 
to cover, this financial burden. 
— Finally, a new sort of inflation arose, as the 
adjustment policies, acting in a perverse 
way, fuelled it and kept it at high levels. This 
was worsened by the destabilizing effect of 
sharp fluctuations in foreign exchange 
receipts and public revenues, as a 
consequence of external factors like the 
collapse of the oil price in 1986. Other 
factors also came into play: the rigidities and 
bottlenecks in distribution worsened and 
speculative behaviour was stimulated. 
the price of oil, sharply curtailed foreign exchange receipts and 
public revenues; c) Repeated increases in the level of international 
interest rates —until late in 1987, when the. crisis in the stock 
exchanges forced them in the opposite direction— made the debt 
service burden heavier and maintained at very high levels the 
transfer of resources for this purpose; d) Long delays in the 
provision of new financing agreed with the banks (particularly at 
times in which other sources of foreign exchange income were also 
affected, as was the case in 1985-1986) aggravated the financial 
difficulties and led to costlier domestic borrowing (Navarrete, 
1988). 
Along with the short-term adjustment, a 
longer-term process of structural reform was 
consistently pursued. It was implemented prin-
cipally through the rationalization of protection 
and a gradual but relatively fast opening of the 
market; a more open attitude towards direct 
foreign investment; the reduction of the size of 
the public sector, through liquidation, merger or 
sale of non-essential public entities, and a sus-
tained effort to modernize the country's indus-
trial base and to enhance its productivity. 
By their very nature, these structural reform 
policies were bound to produce results over the 
long term. It was expected that they would help 
to increase competitiveness in the economy and 
improve its overall efficiency. Towards 1987, it 
appeared that the trade policies were already 
producing positive results and that the impres-
sive expansion of non-oil exports compared 
with previous years was, at least partially, a 
result of the improvement in competitiveness 
due to a more open market. 
As 1987 drew to a close, it became evident 
that, despite the adjustment measures and the 
structural reform policy followed consistently 
over the previous five years, inflation remained 
the most pressing problem. Mexico's Central 
Bank summarized the situation as follows: 
"In spite of the strengthened public 
finances, the depreciation of the exchange 
rate, the deterioration of the terms of trade 
with respect to the levels prevailing at the 
beginning of the eighties, the modest 
growth of financial savings and the lack of 
net external credit, made the control of 
inflation increasingly difficult, since the 
combination of all these forces enhanced 
inflationary expectations. This, coupled 
with a growing indexation of key prices in 
the economy, placed Mexico on the brink of 
hyperinflation and substantially limited the 
possibilities of success of the gradualistic 
stabilization approach. Under these 
circumstances, a new strategy to attack the 
roots of inflation and to break inflationary 
inertia became necessary. At this juncture, a 
concerted program based on coordinated 
and decreasing price adjustments was 
considered viable" (Banxico, 1989 a). 
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II 
A "socially concerted" approach to stabilization policy 
1. First stage: the Economic 
Solidarity Pact, 1987-1988^ 
Towards the end of 1987, controlling and 
reducing inflation became the top economic 
priority as well as the major social demand. The 
response came through a new programme 
concerted among labour and peasants' unions, 
employers' organizations and government 
representatives: the Economic Solidarity Pact. 
This was to be implemented in two phases: first, 
from mid-December to February, and second, 
starting in March, in successive monthly periods. 
The implementation of the stabilization 
programme was preceded by a set of measures 
designed to increase its viability, to correct 
distortions in the existing price structure, and to 
allow time for the anti-inflation drive to gain 
momentum. This package included: 
a) A 22% depreciation of the controlled 
exchange rate of the Mexican peso, to 2 198.5 to 
the US dollar, restoring a comfortable margin of 
undervaluation. 
b) An increase in the prices of goods and 
services produced by the public sector, which had 
lagged behind inflation, to recover the lost 
ground, to realign mayor relative prices and to 
obtain a very significant and "front-loaded" 
increase in public sector income. Major price 
increases were: petrol, 8 5 % ; electricity 89%; 
fertilizers, 82%, and air fares, 26%. 
c) An increase in domestic interest rates, by 
about 45 points, to reach a level close to 160% 
yearly, in order to "dry out" liquidity in the 
market and to continue attracting back flight 
capital. 
d) A 38% increase in wages to partially 
restore the purchasing power lost as a result of 
inflation. 
After implementing these measures, the 
authorities felt that the main preconditions for 
the success of a stabilization programme had 
'This section is based on Navarrete 1988 and updated with 
information from Banxico (1989) and Banxico (1989 b). 
been fulfilled. These preconditions include very 
moderate public finance operational deficits, 
which could be financed by non-inflationary 
means; availability of external resources or very 
high international reserves, to support the 
implementation of the programme; close 
linkages between domestic and external prices; 
a competitive real exchange rate; absence of 
mayor distortions in relative prices; a sound 
current account position, and a widespread social 
desire to participate in the anti-inflationary 
campaign (Banxico, 1989 a). 
The new programme combined elements of 
an orthodox or conventional demand-curbing 
approach with some heterodox elements. 
Among the former were measures to increase 
public sector revenues and to reduce public 
expenditures so as to strengthen public finances, 
and to curtail credit, in order to absorb excess 
liquidity and reduce aggregate demand. The 
latter elements included the commitment by all 
sectors of society to contain and bring down 
inflation, through a new socially concerted 
income policy approach. Additionally, through 
the accelerated opening-up of the economy, 
international competition would limit domestic 
price increases. 
The measures specifically aimed to curb 
demand were related mainly to public 
expenditure and credit policy. A major reduction 
of public expenditure was envisaged for the first 
months of the year, with the aim of achieving a 
primary economic surplus of about 10% of GDP. 
Credit ceilings on banks were established for 
January and February 1988, equivalent to 90 and 
85%, respectively, of the level of credit granted 
in December 1987. This amounted to a reduction 
in total credit of about 2 5 % in real terms. 
The socially concerted anti-inflationary 
programme for January and February 1988 
included the following elements: 
a) Minimum wages, prices of public-sector-
produced goods and services, and prices of about 
80 basic consumer-good items, included in the 
so-called "basic commodities basket", were to 
remain frozen. 
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b) No authorization would be given to 
increase the prices of a wider range of products 
subject to the administered prices regime. 
c) Restraint would be exercised in fixing 
other non-controlled private sector prices. 
d) Interest and exchange rates would keep 
their flexibility. 
The socially concerted anti-inflationary pro-
gramme was formally agreed among the labour 
and entrepreneurial sectors and the govern-
ment. The labour sector was represented by the 
major unions, both those of urban workers,4 and 
those of rural workers and small landholders.5 
The management sector was represented by 
organizations of agricultural, industrial, com-
merce and services entrepreneurs.6 Finally, the 
Ministers of the Economic Cabinet participated 
on behalf of the government.7 The basic inten-
tion was to involve the most representative 
bodies of workers and employers in the process 
of concertation, to ensure wide acceptance and 
firm commitments to follow the agreed 
measures. 
The initial set of corrective measures, 
implemented in mid-December 1987, brought 
about high inflation rates both in that month 
and in January 1988, with the consumer price 
index increasing by 14.8 and 15.5%. Interest 
rates reached very high nominal levels. For 
instance, the average annual rate of interest for 
the 28-day Treasury bills rose more than 30 
percentage points, from 121.8% in December to 
154.1% in January. The depreciation of the peso 
deepened in both months, with the exchange 
4The Labour Congress, the Mexican Workers'Confederation, 
the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants, and 
the Mexican Regional Labour Confederation. 
'The National Peasant Confederation and the National 
Confederation of small Agricultural, Livestock and Forestry 
Landholders. Later, the National Confederation of Livestock 
Breeders also took part. 
'The Entrepreneurial Co-ordinating Council, the 
Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce, Services and 
Tourism, the Confederation of Chambers of Industry, the 
Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic, the National 
Chamber of Processing Industries, the Mexican Businessmen's 
Council, the Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions, the 
National Agricultural and Livestock Council, the Mexican 
Association of Stockbroking Companies and the Mexico City 
National Chamber of Commerce. 
'The Ministers of Labour and Social Welfare, Programming 
and Budget, Commerce and Industrial Development, Finance and 
Public Credit, Agriculture and Water Resources, and the Interior. 
The President of Mexico chaired the main concertation meetings. 
rate reaching Mex$2 281 to the US dollar at the 
end of February. 
Then, as the results of the concerted 
stabilization programme started to be felt, 
inflation began to drop significantly during 
February (to 8.3%), allowing both interest and 
exchange rates to remain, on average, at levels 
similar to those of the previous month. 
The second phase of the stabilization policy 
was launched in March, through the 
implementation of the concerted incomes policy 
agreed by the parties to the Economic Solidarity 
Pact. 
Towards the end of February, labour, 
management and government representatives 
met to decide about the measures to be 
implemented in the following month. It was 
agreed: 
a) to extend the freeze of the prices of public 
sector goods and services and the prices of the 
"basic commodities basket" goods for a month; 
b) to maintain the administered prices; 
c) to increase minimum wages by 3 % ; 
d) to prevent this increase from being 
transferred to non-controlled prices; 
e) to keep the controlled exchange rate 
unchanged and to reduce interest rate levels pari 
passu with the lower inflationary expectations. 
The results obtained in March were 
encouraging: the inflation rate, measured by the 
consumer price index, came down to 5.1% and, 
as a result, year-on-year inflation fell for the first 
time since very early in 1987. There was also a 
substantial unprecedented reduction in interest 
rate levels: the average yearly rate for 28-day 
Treasury bills fell from 151.4% at the end of 
February to 67.9% in the first week of April, 
reflecting sharply reduced inflationary 
expectations. As planned, the controlled 
exchange rate remained frozen, at the level of 
Mex$2 282.00 to the US dollar, without 
noticeable pressures on the foreign exchange 
market. 
The parties to the Pact met again towards 
the end of March and, this time, they decided to 
set measures and objectives for the following 
two months. The lengthening of the period was 
designed to preserve and widen the effect of the 
change of direction of the inflationary inertia, 
noticeable in the behaviour of prices in March, 
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and to provide a slightly longer horizon for 
short-term decisions.8 
It was agreed that during April and May: 
a) official and controlled prices would not be 
increased; b) administered prices would remain 
unchanged; c) the utmost restraint would be 
applied in fixing the other private sector prices, 
which should not be increased, because labour 
and input costs had been largely stabilized and 
financial costs were decreasing fast; d) wages 
would be kept at the prevailing levels, and e) the 
controlled exchange rate would not be further 
depreciated and interest rate levels would 
continue to be adjusted to reflect the lower 
inflationary expectations. 
The results of the implementation of the 
programme in April and May continued to be 
encouraging: inflation registered a further drop, 
larger than expected, moving down to 3.1% in 
April and to 1.9% in May. Continued stability of 
the exchange rate did not erode foreign 
exchange reserves in a significative way, and 
both interest rate levels and inflationary 
expectations continued to decline. The average 
yearly rate for 28-day Treasury bills in May was 
50.7%: more than 100 points less than in 
February and more than 40 points less than two 
months earlier. 
Encouraged by these results, the labour, 
management and government representatives 
agreed at the end of May to extend the 
programme, this time for a further three-month 
period (June-August). The main decisions were: 
a) to continue the freeze of the minimum and 
other wages, prices of public sector goods and 
services and prices of products included in the 
"basic commodities basket"; b) to continue 
denying authorization for increasing the 
administered prices; c) to apply certain price 
reductions, given the sharp fall in production 
costs accumulated over the previous three 
months; d) to maintain the controlled exchange 
rate unchanged at the level at which it had been 
frozen since the beginning of March 
(Mex$2 281 to the US dollar), and e) to continue 
8
 A political motivation was also involved: if the longer-
period programming (say two months) should become the rule, 
there would be no need for a concertation round towards the end of 
June, just a week or so before the Presidential and Congressional 
elections. 
reducing nominal interest rates, in line with the 
sharply reduced inflationary expectations. 
The consumer price index increased by 2% 
in June, 1.7% in July and 0.9% in August. At the 
end of this three-month period, in August, the 
average yearly rate for 28-day Treasury bills 
stood at 41.3%: nearly 10 percentage points less 
than in May. The international reserves kept a 
healthy level, despite the freeze of the exchange 
rate. 
The fifth round of concertation among 
labour, management and government 
representatives was held in mid-August and an 
agreement was reached to extend the 
programme for a further three-month period. 
Later, in mid-October, it was agreed to carry it 
over for an additional month until the end of the 
year, thus covering a four-month period. On this 
occasion, they not only ratified the by then 
already usual measures relating to immobility of 
the prices of public sector and "basic basket" 
goods and the wage and exchange rate freezes 
but also agreed on several additional measures: 
a) Tax reductions aimed to benefit low-
income consumers, such as the elimination of 
the 6% value-added tax on processed food and 
medicines and a 30% reduction of income-tax 
rates applicable to taxpayers earning no more 
than four times the legal minimum wage. 
b) The lowering, by an average of 3 % of the 
prices of goods not subject to control, 
particularly in the food and apparel sectors. 
The behaviour of prices in this four-month 
period was uneven. In September and October, 
the consumer price index showed very moderate 
increases (0.6 and 0.8%), fully in line with the 
downward trend that had started with the 
inception of the stabilization programme at the 
beginning of the year. In November and 
December, however, the monthly increases were 
1.3 and 2.1%. Similarly, the prices of the "basic 
commodities basket" items, which were formally 
frozen, actually went down in the first two 
months of the period (-1.1% in September 
and -0.5% in October), but increased by 1.3% in 
November and 1.7% in December. This 
behaviour, at odds with the objectives formally 
agreed upon, provoked intense debate: 
entrepreneurs were accused of not respecting 
the established commitments, and labour 
demands to end the wage freeze grew louder. 
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Reflecting the evolution of prices, interest 
rates stopped falling as of September and 
increases were recorded. For instance, the aver-
age yearly rate for 28-day Treasury bills stood at 
52.3% in December: 11 points higher than four 
months before. Additionally, significative ero-
sion of the international reserves started to be 
felt: at the close of the year, their level was 
US$6.6 billion: less than half the US$15 billion 
reached at the end of 1987. 
Looking at the situation at the end of 1988, it 
seems safe to argue that the stabilization pro-
gramme succeeded in reversing the inflationary 
inertia. The factors that had pushed up inflation 
in previous years started to work in the other 
direction: by the end of the year, public sector 
prices had remained unchanged for a full 12-
month period; the controlled exchange rate had 
been frozen for 10 months, without significant 
departures from the free-rate level; nominal 
interest rates had been dramatically reduced, 
although the real rates remained high and attrac-
tive; and public sector expenditure had been 
reduced and further adjusted in line with the 
diminished inflationary expectations. The target 
of less than 2% monthly inflation —originally 
envisaged for the end of the year— was achieved 
as early as May, and the monthly inflation rate 
averaged 1.1% in the third quarter and 1.4% in 
the last. Year-to-year inflation dropped from 
159.2% in 1987 to 51.7% in 1988. 
The general evolution of the economy in 
1988 was largely determined by the successful 
implementation of the stabilization programme. 
Real economic growth was 1.1% (only 0.4 
points less than in 1987), because the restrictive 
effects of the stabilization policy were partially 
offset by the increase of exports (especially non-
oil products), the positive reaction of private 
investment (which augmented 10.1% in real 
terms) and the decrease in the prices of imported 
goods brought about by the trade liberalization 
measures. 
2. The second stage: from 
stabilization to growth, 1989 
The new Mexican administration which took 
office on December 1988 decided to continue the 
socially concerted approach to the stabilization 
policy, taking advantage of the experience 
accumulated over the previous year.9 
In mid-December, the representatives of 
labour, business and government decided on a 
new programme, the Pact for Stability and 
Economic Growth, and designed the policies to 
be followed over the first seven months of 1989. 
(Banxico, 1989 a and "Pact, 1989). The new 
programme was similar in design to the 
previous one, but it entailed important 
alterations. One, particularly noteworthy, was 
the lengthening of the period over which the 
agreed policy measures were to be implemented. 
The aim was to reduce the uncertainty generated 
by the shorter-term approach used in 1988 and 
to give the economic policy better overall 
direction. 
The main objectives of the stabilization 
drive were also reviewed, stressing the need to 
consolidate price stability, to establish the basis 
for a gradual and firm economic recovery, to 
protect the purchasing power of salaries and 
employment levels, and to reduce the net 
transfer of resources abroad (basically linked to 
the external debt service). 
To launch the new programme, several 
initial measures were adopted in relation to 
public sector prices, the exchange rate and wage 
levels. 
a) Recognizing that the year-long freeze of 
public sector prices was eroding public revenue 
levels and that on the other hand a sharp, 
generalized adjustment would reignite inflation, 
it was agreed to adjust the prices of some goods 
and services, sold mainly to industrial and 
commercial enterprises, and maintain the freeze 
on those with the greatest incidence on 
consumer expenditure, such as gasoline, 
electricity and gas for domestic use. 
b) As it was clear that the 10-month freeze 
of the rate of exchange was eroding the level of 
international reserves but that reaching 
inflation levels similar to those prevailing in 
9As the new Pact for Stability and Economic Growth was 
being announced at the beginning of 1989, there was a strong 
feeling that, if the stabilization drive were to continue being 
successful, the only major restriction on restoring economic 
growth might well be the very heavy burden of debt service 
payments, which in 1988 reached US$14.2 billion, equivalent to 
43.6% of current account income and representing a net financial 
transfer abroad of 6.4% of the GDP. 
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Mexico's major trading partners would still take 
some time, it was agreed to depreciate by one 
peso daily the rate of exchange of the Mexican 
peso vis-a-vis the US dollar, between 1 January 
and 31 July 1989. Accordingly, the rate would 
move from Mex$2 281 to Mex$2 491 to the 
dollar. This preannounced devaluation of about 
9% would dispel uncertainty about the exchange 
rate level, removing the fear of a major 
devaluation without pushing inflation up too 
much. 
c) Since it was realized that the 10-month 
freeze of minimum wages had translated into a 
further reduction of real wage levels, it was 
agreed to increase the minimum wage level by 
8% with the aim of avoiding further losses of 
purchasing power. This increase was deemed 
compatible with the stabilization objectives. 
Other elements in the new programme, to 
be followed during the first seven months of 
1989, were the following: 
a) The representatives of business organiza-
tions agreed to recommend their members to 
absorb the wage increase, the adjustment in the 
exchange rate and the higher prices of public 
goods and services, without raising final prices 
to consumers. 
b) However, in cases where the mainte-
nance of steady prices despite increases in pro-
duction costs would create shortages, price 
revision would be allowed. Moreover, the 
government announced a national programme 
of deregulation, aimed at removing barriers that 
generate unjustified upward pressures on the 
costs of private enterprises. 
c) The government committed itself to 
follow a fiscal policy fully consistent with price 
stability and the gradual and sustained recovery 
of the economy. 
d) The import tariff structure would be 
adjusted in order to reduce rate dispersion and 
eliminate distortions. 
Additionally, the major tools of economic 
policy would be closely linked to the new 
stabilization programme. In this way, discipline 
in the management of the public finances would 
be strengthened. The overall aim for the year 
would be to achieve a drop of 5 percentage points 
in public sector borrowing requirements: from 
12.3% of GDP in 1988 to 7% in 1989. Interest 
rate policy would be aimed at continuing to 
provide investors with positive yields in real 
terms, in order to stimulate savings. However, it 
was foreseen that later in the year —after an 
adequate agreement on debt had been reached 
and as a result of the continued success of the 
stabilization policy— real interest rates would 
start to fall. 
The new stabilization programme succeeded 
in keeping inflation under check in the first 
seven months of 1989, without provoking any 
serious shortages. The consumer price index 
registered an average monthly increase of 1.4% 
and the accumulated inflation in the seven-
month period was 10%. The prices of the "basic 
household commodities basket" registered an 
average monthly increase of 0.8% and an 
accumulated increase of 5.4% over the seven-
month period (Banxico, 1989 c and SRE, 1989). 
Thus, the behaviour of both consumer prices 
and those of the basic basket over the period was 
fully consistent with the initial objective of 
keeping inflation below 20% for the year as a 
whole. 
The inflation rate in January 1989 (2.4%) 
reflected the impact of the selective public sector 
price adjustment introduced at the beginning of 
the year. 
The average rate in the following six months 
(1.3%), however, demonstrated that the impact 
of both the initial wage increase and the daily 
depreciation of the Mexican currency 
were absorbed without major inflationary 
implications. 
After the increase observed in interest rates 
in the last few months of 1988, small 
fluctuations within a general downward trend 
were registered in the first seven months of 
1989. The average yearly rate for 28-day 
Treasury bills stood at 47.0% in July 1989: the 
lowest level since October and more than 5 
percentage points below the December level. 
On 31 May 1989, the National Development 
Plan 1989-1994 was launched.10 The Plan's 
10The Plan sets an economic growth target of 2.9 to 3.5% 
annually for 1989-1991 and of 5.3 to 6.0% yearly for 1992-1994. In 
1983-1988, the annual rate of economic growth was 0.1% on 
average. Additionally, the Plan sets average annual growth rates 
for total investment of 6.3 to 7.3% in 1989-1991 and 8.8 to 9 7 % in 
1992-1984. In 1983-1988, investment averaged a negative annual 
growth rate of 4.4%. Accordingly, the rate of investment, which 
averaged 19.1% of the GDP in 1983-1988, should increase to 
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economic strategy has two main objectives: to 
reach an economic growth rate of about 6% 
yearly and to reduce inflation to levels similar to 
those prevailing in Mexico's major trading 
partners. To attain the latter objective, 
stabilization is seen not as a policy to be 
implemented only over a given period, but as a 
continuous endeavour. The socially concerted 
approach to stabilization, adopted both for the 
Economic Solidarity Pact in 1988 and for the 
Pact for Stability and Economic Growth in 1989-
1990, is thus incorporated into the long-term 
development planning process. 
In mid-June 1989 the labour, management 
and government representatives met to evaluate 
the implementation of the Pact for Stability and 
Economic Growth and decided to extend it for an 
eight-month period: from August 1989 until 
March 1990 (Pacto, 1989 a). Again, it was felt 
that a decision to keep in force the socially 
concerted approach to stabilization, adopted 
well in advance at the end of the concertation 
period and covering a longer new one, would 
help to consolidate the stabilization policy 
objectives, strengthen confidence in the future 
course of economic policy, discourage 
speculation and provide a firmer framework for 
investment decisions. 
The new eight-month extension was based 
on a set of reciprocal commitments by the 
government, labour and business sectors, as well 
as on concrete policy measures. The main 
agreements were the following: 
a) The public sector would keep its prices 
and rates unchanged. 
b) The business sector committed itself to 
respect and not raise prices, as well as to provide 
sufficient and timely supplies. 
c) Wages would be set through negotiations 
between the labour and management sectors. It 
was agreed to increase the minimum wage by 
6%. 
d) The daily one peso depreciation of the 
exchange rate would be continued until 31 
March 1990, "without abandoning the aim of 
22.7/23.1% in 1989-1991, and 25.6/26.0% in 1992-1994. 
According to the Plan, the net transfer of resources abroad, which 
averaged 6.1% of the GDP in 1983-1988, should decrease to 
1.7/2.1% in 1989-1991 and further decrease to 1.5/1.7% in 
1992-1994 (Mexico, Presidencia de la República, 1989). 
stabilizing the exchange rate as soon as 
circumstances permit". For the end of the 
period, the rate would be Mex$2 734 to the 
dollar: a devaluation of 9 8 % over the eight 
months. 
e) The strict discipline in public finances 
would be maintained in order to achieve the 
objectives established, particularly the primary 
surplus and the lowering of the PSBR. 
On 23 July 1989, the President of Mexico 
announced to the Nation that agreement had 
been reached in principle with the banks 
regarding Mexico's external debt. This 
agreement followed those concluded earlier in 
the year with the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank and the Paris Club. Taken 
together, these agreements removed the major 
restriction for the resumption of economic 
growth, namely the inordinate amount of net 
transfers of resources abroad due to the external 
debt service. It was estimated that, once the 
agreements were in full operation, the net 
transfer of resources abroad would diminish 
from 6.4% of the country's GDP in 1988 to less 
than 3 % . u 
"In mid-April 1989 Mexico signed an Extended Facility 
Agreement with the IMF covering a period of three years and 
providingresources for 2.8 billion SDRs (US$3.64 billion). It was 
agreed that up to 30% of these resources could be used to finance 
debt reduction operations. Additionally, Mexico obtained 4535 
million SDRs (US$590 million) compensatory, financing loan. 
Agreement was reached with the World Bank on 18 May 1989 on a 
credit package of US$1.96 billion. The package has four 
components, with US$500 million being used to support Mexico's 
financial sector and its anti-inflationary strategy; a portion of these 
resources could be used for debt reduction operations. A second 
US$500 million credit will support modernization of the industrial 
and commercial sectors; a third tranche of the same amount, will 
finance restructuring of the State-owned sector, and, finally, 
US$ 460 million will be channelled to the construction of two 
hydroelectric projects. The agreement with the Paris Club, signed 
on 30 May 1989, allows for the rescheduling of US$2.1 billion in 
principal and US$ 500 million in interest of official and officially-
guaranteed credits, due between June 1989 and June 1992, over a 
period of 10 years with a six-year grace period. Export credit 
financing will continue to be available for Mexico. The agreement 
with the banks' Advisory Committee foresees that the existing 
debt will be exchanged for new 30-year-maturity Mexican 
government bonds. It provides three options for the banks: either 
to accept new bonds with a face value 35% less than the nominal 
value of the old debt and carrying a market rate of interest, or to 
accept bonds with the same face value as the old debt but carrying a 
fixed, below-market interest rate of 6.25%. (Both the principal and 
some of the interest of the new bonds will be guaranteed by 
resources obtained by Mexico from the multilateral financial 
bodies and from the Government of Japan.) The third option 
allows the banks to provide new money over four years, starting in 
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Both in August and in September inflation 
stood at a monthly rate of only 1 %, bringing the 
accumulated rate for the first nine months of the 
year to only 12% despite the wage increase and 
the continued depreciation of the Mexican peso. 
A major factor in keeping inflation at bay 
was the substantial drop in interest rates. The 
average yearly rate for 28-day Treasury bills 
(used throughout this text as representative of 
interest rate movements) dropped by more than 
12 percentage points in August compared with 
the previous month, to stand at 34.9%: the 
lowest level since 1982. It fell still further, to 
34.2%, in September. It is clear that this 
substantial drop in interest rates was a direct 
result of the debt deal, which removed the main 
factor of uncertainty about Mexico's economic 
prospects. 
In the last quarter of 1989 some warning 
lights started to blink. According to preliminary 
estimates, inflation in October amounted to 
1.3%, in November it reached 2.1%, and in the 
first half of December prices rose by 1.8%, 
raising fears that an "inflationary bubble" was in 
the making, despi te the continued 
implementation of the stabilization programme. 
Since October, interest rates rose moderately. 
The average yearly rate for 28-day Treasury bills 
moved up slightly, to 37.6%, in the first half of 
that month, and continued edging upwards, 
reaching 41.3 % in early December. The news on 
the external front was not encouraging, as the 
rate of increase of manufactured exports 
declined and the current account deficit 
increased. On the public finances front, the 
additional expenditure brought about by the 
interest rate increases started to exert pressure, 
particularly after the nearly two-year freeze of 
prices of major public sector goods and services. 
All these factors stimulated an intense public 
debate, occupying ample spaces in the Mexican 
press, about the prospects of the stabilization 
programme and, particularly, about the 
1989, for an amount equivalent to 25% of the nominal value of the 
Mexican debt with each bank. The Mexican Finance Ministry 
envisages that the first option will allow for a permanent reduction 
of 35% in the value of the debt (in repaying its debt Mexico will 
cover only 65% of the original nominal value), and the second 
option provides for a reduction of about 40% in the annual debt 
service transfers, and the third one will provide additional 
resources on a multi-year basis (Salinas de Gortari, 1989 a). 
transition from the stage of socially concerted 
stabilization policies to an open and free play of 
market forces towards the early Spring of 1990. 
Early in December, the labour, management 
and government representatives met again to 
evaluate the implementation of the stabilization 
programme. They decided to extend the 
implementation of the Pact, on the terms agreed 
in June 1989 and in force since August, for an 
additional period of four months, until the end of 
July 1990. In this way, the actual period of 
concertation, originally envisaged for eight 
months, would cover a full year. Addressing the 
session, the Mexican President stressed that the 
objective of the stabilization policy was "not to 
immobilize or freeze all prices, but to guarantee 
general price stability and to insure against 
increases not agreed to by the parties" ("Pacto, 
1989 b). 
Accordingly, two major modifications were 
introduced: 
a) An increase averaging 5% was made in 
the prices of gasoline and other public sector 
goods and services such as electricity rates, in 
order to avoid further erosion of public revenues 
and a deterioration of the financial position of 
the public enterprises involved. 
b) A 10% increase in the minimum wage 
was agreed upon, to be implemented as from 1 
December, in order to maintain the objective of 
generally preventing further decreases of the 
workers' purchasing power. 
In closing this analysis of the formulation 
and implementation of the stabilization policy in 
Mexico over the last two years, reference should 
be made to the mechanism established to 
oversee the policy's actual performance and to 
ensure that any adjustments needed were made 
in a timely manner. Ever since the inception of 
the Economic Solidarity Pact in December 1987, 
a system of permanent evaluation has been in 
place, with the parties to the concertation 
process —workers, businessmen and govern-
ment representatives— forming part of a 
Follow-up and Evaluation Commission. 
This body met regularly at least twice a 
month and held many extraordinary meetings. It 
heard views on the way in which the agreed 
measures were being applied and, particularly, it 
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heard complaints about violations of the agreed 
commi tmen t s . The Commission was 
empowered to adopt corrective measures and, 
even more, acted as a forum to constantly review 
the behaviour of the economic agents involved 
in the implementation of the stabilization 
policy. Both the government's spending policy 
and the private decisions on fixing prices were 
At the close of the 1980s, the behaviour of the 
Mexican economy is reflecting the results of the 
stabilization effort maintained over the last two 
years. The primary aim of the stabilization 
policy to —bring down inflation and keep it 
low— has been largely achieved. It seems that 
the economic agents have abandoned the 
"inflationary frame of mind" in which they were 
trapped for several years. For 22 months, from 
November 1986 to August 1988, the year-to-
year inflation rate stood at levels of three digits 
and the country was on the brink of 
hyperinflation. The socially concerted approach 
chosen to implement the stabilization policy 
showed that, as the Mexican President put it in 
his first annual report: 
"Mexicans have rejected the option of living 
with high inflation. [They] found a strategic 
answer to this problem in the Pact. It has not 
been an easy or flattering answer, but it is 
working because we have been able to 
complement concerted social agreement 
with fiscal discipline" (Salinas de Gortari, 
1989 b). 
Information available so far is still 
insufficient and does not allow for a full balance 
of the relative contribution of each one of the 
three sectors involved in the stabilization policy. 
However, the following indications seem 
appropriate: 
a) From 1982 to 1987, real wages, measured 
by deflating the nominal minimum wage with 
the consumer price index, decreased 35.4%. In 
closely scrutinized during the Commission 
meetings. 
To co-operate in this process, state-level 
commissions were established in the 31 entities 
(provinces) of the country. These state-level 
commissions also met regularly and presented 
their findings and recommendations to the 
national Commission. 
the 19-month period from January 1988 to 
September 1989, the minimum wage was 
increased on five occasions (as mentioned 
above) and, despite falling inflation, real wages 
deteriorated by a further 18.7%. However, there 
is a trend towards diminishing real wage 
erosion: all the recent purchasing power loss 
occurred in 1988, while from January to 
September 1989, real wages improved, although 
only very slightly: 1.2%. 
It seems indisputable that wage restraint has 
been a major factor in the stabilization process 
and that the contribution of the labour sector to 
it has been of paramount importance. 
b) During the first half of 1989, according to 
estimates included in the President's annual 
report, the public financial deficit declined by 
60% in real terms, as compared with the deficit a 
year before. The primary balance —which does 
not include debt service payments— showed a 
surplus 31% larger in real terms than a year 
before. Public spending continued to be strictly 
controlled. To alleviate the impact of the 
stabilization policy on lower income groups, 
public expenditure allocation was oriented 
towards social priorities. 
The prices of public sector goods and 
services, which were adjusted in December 1987 
to lay the basis for the stabilization policy, 
remained unchanged for a full year. Then in 
December 1988, a selective increase was 
introduced, which did not apply to those of 
greatest incidence in consumers' expenditure, 
after which all remained unchanged for another 
III 
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year. Only in December 1989 was an increase 
which averaged 5% introduced. 
Consequently, the government contribution 
to the stabilization policy, both through financial 
discipline and direct restraint in fixing prices, 
has been a major one. 
c) The reduction of the nominal levels of 
interest rates and, lately, a small reduction in real 
rates has contributed decisively to the lowering 
of inflation. However, through most of the 
period of implementation of the stabilization 
policy, real rates have been positive and, in some 
months, highly positive. The real yearly yield of 
major short-term saving instruments was 
between 21.9 and 28.3% at the close of 1988 and 
between 12.7 and 20.7% in September 1988 
(SRE, 1989). 
It is clear that interest income-earners are 
among those making the least sacrifice towards 
the stabilization objectives —to put it very 
mildly. 
In more general terms, it seems that the 
major strategic decisions behind the success of 
Mexico's stabilization policy were the following: 
a) The decision to put an end to the negative 
process of cumulative causation in which some 
elements of the traditional adjustment policies 
—particularly the management of interest and 
exchange rates and public sector prices— were 
perversely fueling inflation, although 
apparently they were contributing to the 
adjustment objectives by stimulating savings 
and exports, discouraging capital flight and 
avoiding the worsening of the public deficit. 
This aspect of the Mexican experience is of 
paramount importance, as traditional adjust-
ment recipes continue to be prescribed, without 
due regard to the specific situation in which 
those policies are to be applied. 
b) The decision to launch a process of social 
concertation as the basic instrument to design, 
implement and oversee the stabilization 
policies. 
A larger objective of the stabilization effort 
was, of course, to lay the basis for the resumption 
of economic growth. Here the initial results are 
also encouraging. It has already been noted that 
in 1988 the Mexican economy actually grew by 
1.1%. In the first half of 1989, according to 
figures contained in the President's first annual 
report, Mexico's economy grew 2.4% in real 
terms compared with the same period of the 
previous year. Accordingly, it is expected that 
economic growth in 1989 as a whole will be 
between 2.5% and 3%: well above the initial 
estimates of about 1.5% (Presidencia, 1989 d). 
For the first time since 1985 economic growth 
will be higher than the population growth rate, 
leaving room for improvement (albeit very 
slight) of the per capita product. 
In assessing this situation, the Presidential 
report strikes a note of caution: 
"We are resuming growth at a faster rate 
than expected and even at a faster pace than 
is desirable. We cannot force the rate of 
recovery, because the lack of investment in 
infrastructure during the years of the crisis 
would now lead to bottlenecks and 
inflationary pressures" (Salinas de Gortari, 
1989 d). 
Precisely this question —growth and 
stability— is now at the centre of the economic 
policy debate in Mexico: how to ensure a safe 
landing for the stabilization policy which took 
off two years ago. 
There seems to be a growing consensus to 
the effect that, even after the Pact for Stability 
and Economic Growth concludes, at the end of 
July 1990 or at a later date, some sort of socially 
concerted approach to formulation and imple-
mentation of economic policy will be needed. 
The greater predictability of the behaviour of the 
different economic agents that this approach 
provides will be particularly important in a 
period in which uncertainty about other factors, 
specially in the external sector of the economy, is 
bound to increase. 
However, if the socially concerted approach 
is to remain credible and generally acceptable, a 
fairer distribution of the costs and benefits than 
that prevailing so far is clearly needed. If the 
stabilization effort has been borne mainly by the 
labour sector, then the workers and peasants 
should benefit directly from the resumption of 
economic growth that the stabilization itself 
made possible. 
Falling back into problems that seemed to 
have been overcome has not been alien to the 
Mexican experience in the last decades. At this 
juncture, it is essential to avoid this danger, 
which is clearly present in an over-precipitate 
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recovery. On the other hand, the prolongation of 
the years of economic stagnation or, even worse, 
the relapse into acute instability, is socially and 
politically unacceptable. 
In the 1990s, Mexico needs a growing 
economy, matched with price stability and 
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